Quoted in: Ausaf Ahmed (1994). * Unit of currency not
given.
The main reason of course is the need to participate in the
enterprise on a PLS basis which involves time consuming complicated assessment
procedures and negotiations, requiring expertise and experience. The banks do
not seem to have developed the latter and they seem to be averse to the
former. There are no commonly accepted criteria for project evaluation based
on PLS partnerships. Each single case has to be treated separately with utmost
care and each has to be assessed and negotiated on its own merits. Other
obvious reasons are: a) such investments tie up capital for very long periods,
unlike in conventional banking where the capital is recovered in regular
instalments almost right from the beginning, and the uncertainty and risk are
that much higher, b) the longer the maturity of the project the longer it
takes to realise the returns and the banks therefore cannot pay a return to
their depositors as quick as the conventional banks can. Thus it is no wonder
that the banks are averse to such investments.
4.3.1.2 Small businesses
Small scale businesses form a major part of a country's
productive sector. Besides, they form a greater number of the bank's
clientele. Yet it seems difficult to provide them with the necessary financing
under the PLS scheme, even though there is excess liquidity in the banks. The
observations of Iqbal and Mirakhor14 is revealing:
Given the comprehensive criteria to be followed in
granting loans and monitoring their use by banks, small-scale enterprises
have, in general encountered greater difficulties in obtaining financing
than their large-scale counterparts in the Islamic Republic of Iran. This
has been particularly relevant for the construction and service sectors,
which have large share in the gross domestic product (GDP). The service
sector is made up of many small producers for whom the banking sector has
not been able to provide sufficient financing. Many of these small
producers, who traditionally were able to obtain interest-based credit
facilities on the basis of collateral, are now finding it difficult to raise
funds for their operations.
4.3.1.3 Running businesses
Running businesses frequently need short-term capital as
well as working capital and ready cash for miscellaneous on-the-spot purchases
and sundry expenses. This is the daily reality in the business world. Very
little thought seems to have been given to this important aspect of the
business world's requirement. The PLS scheme is not geared to cater to this
need. Even if there is complete trust and exchange of information between the
bank and the business it is nearly impossible or prohibitively costly to
estimate the contribution of such short-term financing on the return of a
given business. Neither is the much used mark-up system suitable in this case.
It looks unlikely to be able to arrive at general rules to cover all the
different situations.
Added to this is the delays involved in authorising
emergency loans. One staff member of the Bank of Industry and Mines of Iran
has commented:15
Often the clients need to have quick access to fresh funds
for the immediate needs to prevent possible delays in the project's
implementation schedule. According to the set regulations, it is not
possible to bridge-finance such requirements and any grant of financial
assistance must be made on the basis of the project's appraisal to
determine type and terms and conditions of the scheme of financing.
The enormity of the damage or hindrance caused by the
inability to provide financing to this sector will become clear if we realise
that running businesses and enterprises are the mainstay of the country's
very economic survival.
4.3.1.4 Government borrowing
In all countries the Government accounts for a major
component of the demand for credit -- both short-term and long-term. Unlike
business loans these borrowings are not always for investment purposes, nor
for investment in productive enterprises. Even when invested in productive
enterprises they are generally of a longer-term type and of low yield. This
latter only multiplies the difficulties in estimating a rate of return on
these loans if they are granted under the PLS scheme. In Iran,16
...... it has been decreed that financial transactions
between and among the elements of the public sector, including Bank Markazi
[the central bank] and commercial banks that are wholly nationalised, can
take place on the basis of a fixed rate of return; such a fixed rate is not
viewed as interest. Therefore the Government can borrow from the
nationalised banking system without violating the Law.
While the last claim may be subject to question, there is
another serious consequence:17
Continued borrowing on a fixed rate basis by the
Government would inevitably index bank charges to this rate than to the
actual profits of borrowing entities.
4.3.2 Legislation
Existing banking laws do not permit banks to engage directly
in business enterprises using depositors' funds. But this is the basic asset
acquiring method of Islamic banks. Therefore new legislation and/or government
authorisation are necessary to establish such banks. In Iran a comprehensive
legislation was passed to establish Islamic banks. In Pakistan the Central
Bank was authorised to take the necessary steps. In other countries either the
banks found ways of using existing regulations or were given special
accommodation. In all cases government intervention or active support was
necessary to establish Islamic banks working under the PLS scheme.
In spite of this, there is still need for further auxiliary
legislation in order to fully realise the goals of Islamic banking. For
example, in Pakistan,18
... the new law has been introduced without fundamental
changes in the existing laws governing contracts, mortgages, and pledges.
Similarly no law has been introduced to define modes of participatory
financing, that is Musharakah19 and PTCs. It is presumed
that whenever there is a conflict between the Islamic banking framework and
the existing law, the latter will prevail. In essence, therefore, the
relationship between the bank and the client, that of creditor and debtor is
left unchanged as specified by the existing law. .... The existing banking
law was developed to protect mainly the credit transactions; its application
to other modes of financing results in the treatment of those modes as
credit transactions also. Banks doubt whether some contracts, though
consistent with the Islamic banking framework, would be acceptable in the
courts. Hence, incentives exist for default and abuse.
In Iran, although the law establishing interest-free banking20
... is comprehensive, the lack of proper definitions of
property rights may have constrained bank lending. Thus far there has been
no precise legislative and legal expression of what is viewed as “lawful
and conditional” private property rights. This may also have militated
against investment lending in agricultural and industrial sectors and thus
encouraged increased concentration of assets in short-term trade financing
instruments.
Iran and Pakistan are countries committed to ridding their
economies of riba and have made immense strides in towards achieving
it. Yet there are many legal difficulties still to be solved as we have seen
above. In other Muslim countries the authorities actively or passively
participate in the establishment of Islamic banks on account of their
religious persuasion. Such is not the case in non-Muslim countries. Here
establishing Islamic banks involves conformation to the existing laws of the
concerned country which generally are not conducive to PLS type of financing
in the banking sector. We will see some of these problems below in section
4.4.
4.3.3
Involvement in specialised non-bank activities
Dr Hasanuz-Zaman, lists the traditional tasks of the bank
and then questions its ability to take on the additional functions it is
called upon to perform under the PLS scheme:21
It is due to historical reasons that banks have evolved
purely as a financial institution. They are suited to attract money, keep it
in safe custody, lend it under safety, invest it profitably and enjoy the
capacity to create the means of payment. A bank has to maintain a balance
between income, liquidity and flexibility. While allocating its funds it has
to be meticulously sensitive about the factors like capital position and
rate of profitability of various types of loans, stability of deposit,
economic conditions, influence of monetary and fiscal policy, ability and
experience of bank's personnel and credit needs of the area. So far these
banks thrive on a fixed rate of return a portion of which is passed on by
them to the depositor. Thus the entire effort of a bank is directed towards
money management and it is not geared to act as an entrepreneur, trader,
industrialist, contractor or caterer.
The question arises: with all these limitations can a bank
claim any competence in trading or entrepreneurship which is necessary for musharakah
or mudarba22 contract, or can it act as an owner of a
large variety of heavy machinery, transport vehicles or real estate to take
the position of a lessor or, can it act as a stockist to buy and resell the
entire stock of imports and exports that are needed by genuine traders?
Then he raises the even more serious question:
In case the bank is historically and practically not
competent to do all these jobs its claim to share a portion of profits as a
working partner, trader or lessor becomes questionable.
Traditional banks do perform a certain amount of project
evaluation when granting large medium- and long-term loans. But doing such
detailed evaluation as would be required to embark on a PLS scheme, such as
determining the rates of return and their time schedule, is beyond the scope
of conventional banks. So is the detailed accounting and monitoring necessary
to determine the actual performance.
Under Islamic banking these exercises are not limited to
relatively few large loans but need to be carried out on nearly all the
advances made by the bank. Yet, widely acceptable and reliable techniques are
yet to be devised. This is confounded by the fact that no consensus has yet
been reached on the principles. Both the unprecedented nature of the task as
well as the huge amount of work that need be done and the trained and
experienced personnel needed to carry them out seems a daunting prospect.
4.3.4 Re-training
of staff
As was seen in the previous section, the bank staff will
have to acquire many new skills and learn new procedures to operate the
Islamic banking system. This is a time consuming process which is aggravated
by two other factors. One, the sheer number of persons that need to be
re-trained and, two, the additional staff that need to be recruited and
trained to carry out the increased work.
Principles are still to be laid down and techniques and
procedures evolved to carry them out. It is only after the satisfactory
achievement of these that proper training can begin. This delay and the
resulting confusion appears to be among the main reasons for the banks to
stick to modes of financing that are close to the familiar interest-based
modes.
4.3.5 Other
disincentives
Among the other disincentives from the borrower's point of
view are the need to disclose his accounts to the bank if he were to borrow on
the PLS basis, and the fear that eventually the tax authorities will become
wise to the extent of his business and the profits. Several writers have
lashed out at the lack of business ethics among the business community, but
that is a fact of life at least for the foreseeable future. There is a paucity
of survey or case studies of clients to see their reaction to current modes of
financing. As such we are not aware of further disincentives that might be
there.
4.3.5.1 Accounts
When a business is financed under the PLS scheme it is
necessary that the actual profit/loss made using that money be calculated.
Though no satisfactory methods have yet been devised, the first requirement
for any such activity is to have the necessary accounts. On the borrowers'
side there are two difficulties: one, many small-time businessmen do not keep
any accounts, leave alone proper accounts. The time and money costs will cut
into his profits. Larger businesses do not like to disclose their real
accounts to anybody. On the banks' side the effort and expense involved in
checking the accounts of many small accounts is prohibitive and will again cut
into their own share of the profits. Thus both sides would prefer to avoid
having to calculate the actually realised profit/loss. To quote Iqbal and
Mirakhor:23
.... the commercial banks do face an element of moral
hazard owing to the non-existence of systematic book-keeping in this sector.
Additionally the reluctance of small producers to submit their operations to
bank audits and the perceived enormous cost of auditing and monitoring
relative to the small size of the potential credits makes banks unwilling to
extend credit on the basis of new modes of financing to these small
producers. These reduced lending to small producers may also explain the
existence of excess liquidity in the banking system.
4.3.5.2 Tax
The bank is a big business and it has to declare its profit
and loss and is legally required to present an audited account of its
operations. Once the bank's accounts are known it doesn't take much for
the tax collectors to figure out the share of the businesses financed by the
bank under the PLS scheme. Thus it's no surprise that businesses are not too
very happy about the situation. The fact that suggestions have been made to
use the banks to collect taxes due has not helped the matter either.
4.3.6 Excess liquidity
Presence of excess liquidity is reported in nearly all
Islamic banks. This is not due to reduced demand for credit but the due to the
inability of the banks to find clients willing to be funded under the new
modes of financing. Some of these difficulties are mentioned under section
4.3.1 Financing. Here we have a situation where there is money available on
the one hand and there is need for it on the other but the new rules stand in
the way of bringing them together! This is a very strange situation --
specially in the developing Muslim countries where money is at a premium even
for ordinary economic activities, leave alone development efforts. Removal of
riba was expected to ease such difficulties, not to aggravate the already
existing ones!
4.3.7
Uneasy questions of morality
The practices in use by the Islamic banks have evoked
questions of morality. Do the practices adopted to avoid interest really do
their job or is it simply a change of name? It suffices to quote a few
authors.24
The Economist writes:25
..... Muslim theoreticians and bankers have between them
devised ingenious ways of coping with the interest problem. One is murabaha.
The Koran says you cannot borrow $100m from the bank for a year, at 5%
interest, to buy the new machinery your factory needs? Fine. You get the
bank to buy the machinery for you -- cost, $100m -- and then you buy the
stuff from the bank, paying it $105m a year from now. The difference is that
the extra $5m is not interest on loan, which the Koran (perhaps) forbids,
but your thanks to the bank for the risk it takes of losing money while it
is the owner of the machinery: this is honest trading, okay with the Koran.
Since with modern communications the bank's ownership may last about half
a second, its risk is not great, but the transaction is pure. It is not
surprising that some Muslims uneasily sniff logic-chopping here.
Dr Ghulam Qadir says of practices in Pakistan:26
Two of the modes of financing prescribed by the State
Bank, namely financing through the purchase of client's property with a
buy-back agreement and sale of goods to clients on a mark-up, involved the
least risk and were closest to the old interest-based operations. Hence the
banks confined their operations mostly to these modes, particularly the
former, after changing the simple buy-back agreement (prescribed by the
State Bank) to buy-back agreement with a mark-up, as otherwise there was no
incentive for them to extend any finances. The banks also reduced their
mark-up-based financing, whether through the purchase of client's property
or through the sale of goods to clients, to mere paper work, instead of
actual buying of goods (property), taking their possession and then selling
(back) to the client. As a result, there was no difference between the
mark-up as practised by the banks and the conventional interest rate, and
hence it was judged repugnant to Islam in the recent decision of the Federal
Shari'ah court.
As banks are essentially financial institutions and not
trading houses, requiring them to undertake trading in the form of buy-back
arrangements and sale on mark-up amounts to imposing on them a function for
which they are not well equipped. Therefore, banks in Pakistan made such
modifications in the prescribed modes which defeated the very purpose of
interest-free financing. Furthermore, as these two minimum-risk modes of
financing were kept open to banks, they never tried to devise innovative and
imaginative modes of financing within the framework of musharakah and
mudarba.
Prof. Khurshid Ahmad says:27
Murabaha (cost-plus financing) and bai'
mu'ajjal (sale with deferred payment) are permitted in the Shari'ah
under certain conditions. Technically, it is not a form of financial
mediation but a kind of business participation. The Shari'ah assumes that
the financier actually buys the goods and then sells them to the client.
Unfortunately, the current practice of “buy-back on mark-up” is not in
keeping with the conditions on which murabaha or bai' mu'ajjal
are permitted. What is being done is a fictitious deal which ensures
a predetermined profit to the bank without actually dealing in goods or
sharing any real risk. This is against the letter and spirit of Shari'ah
injunctions.
While I would not venture a fatwa, as I do not
qualify for that function, yet as a student of economics and Shari'ah I
regard this practice of “buy-back on mark-up” very similar to riba and
would suggest its discontinuation. I understand that the Council of Islamic
Ideology has also expressed a similar opinion.
Dr Hasanuz Zaman is more scathing in his condemnation:28
It emerges that practically it is impossible for large
banks or the banking system to practise the modes like mark-up, bai'
salam, buy-back, murabaha, etc. in a way that fulfils the
Shari'ah conditions. But in order to make themselves eligible to a return
on their operations, the banks are compelled to play tricks with the
letters of the law. They actually do not buy, do not posses, do not
actually sell and deliver the goods; but the transition is assumed to have
taken place. By signing a number of documents of purchase, sale and transfer
they might fulfil a legal requirement but it is by violating the spirit
of prohibition.
Again,29
It seems that in large number of cases the ghost of
interest is haunting them to calculate a fixed rate percent per annum
even in musharakah, mudarba, leasing, hire-purchase, rent
sharing, murabaha, (bai' mu'ajjal, mark-up), PTC, TFC, 30etc.
The spirit behind all these contracts seems to make a sure earning
comparable with the prevalent rate of interest and, as far as possible,
avoid losses which otherwise could occur.
To sum up, in Dr Hasanuz Zaman's words:31
... many techniques that the interest-free banks are
practising are not either in full conformity with the spirit of Shari'ah
or practicable in the case of large banks or the entire banking system.
Moreover, they have failed to do away with undesirable aspects of
interest. Thus, they have retained what an Islamic bank should eliminate.
4.4
Islamic banking in non-Muslim countries
The modern commercial banking system in nearly all countries
of the world is mainly evolved from and modelled on the practices in Europe,
especially that in the United Kingdom. The philosophical roots of this system
revolves around the basic principles of capital certainty for depositors and
certainty as to the rate of return on deposits. In order to enforce these
principles for the sake of the depositors and to ensure the smooth functioning
of the banking system Central Banks have been vested with powers of
supervision and control. All banks have to submit to the Central Bank rules.
Islamic banks which wish to operate in non-Muslim countries have some
difficulties in complying with these rules. We will examine below the salient
features.32
4.4.1
Certainty of capital and return
While the conventional banks guarantee the capital and rate
of return, the Islamic banking system, working on the principle of profit and
loss sharing, cannot, by definition, guarantee any fixed rate of return on
deposits. Many Islamic banks do not guarantee the capital either, because if
there is a loss it has to be deducted from the capital. Thus the basic
difference lies in the very roots of the two systems. Consequently countries
working under conventional laws are unable to grant permission to institutions
which wish to operate under the PLS scheme to functions as commercial banks.
Two official comments, one from the UK an the other from the USA suffice to
illustrate this.
Sir Leigh Pemberton, the Governor of the Bank of England,
told the Arab Bankers' Association in London that:33
| It is important not to risk misleading and confusing
the general public by allowing two essentially different banking systems
to operate in parallel;
|
| A central feature of the banking system of the United
Kingdom as enshrined in the legal framework is capital certainty for
depositors. It is the most important feature which distinguished the
banking sector from the other segments of the financial system;
|
| Islamic banking is a perfectly acceptable mode of
financing but it does not fall within the definition of what constitutes
banking in the UK;
|
| The Bank of England is not legally able to authorise
under the Banking Act, an institution which does not take deposits as
defined under that Act;
|
| The Islamic facilities might be provided within other
areas of the financial system without using a banking name. |
In the United States, Mr Charles Schotte, the US Treasury
Department specialist in regulatory issues has remarked:34
There has never been an application for an Islamic
establishment to set up either as a bank or as anything else. So there is no
precedent to guide us. Any institution that wishes to use the word
‘bank' in its title has to guarantee at least a zero rate of interest --
and even that might contravene Islamic laws.
4.4.2
Supervision and control
Besides these, there are other concerns as well. One is the
Central Bank supervision and control. This mainly relates to liquidity
requirements and adequacy of capital. These in turn depend on an assessment of
the value of assets of the Islamic banks. A financial advisor has this to say:35
The bank of England, under the 1979 Act, would have great
difficulty in putting a value on the assets of an Islamic institution which
wanted to operate as a bank in the UK. The traditional banking system has
much of its assets in fixed interest instruments and it is comparatively
easy to value that. For example, if they are British Government instruments
they will have a quoted market value; and there are recognised methods for
valuing traditional banking assets when they become non-productive. But it
is very difficult indeed to value an Islamic asset such as a share in a
joint venture; and the Bank of England would have to send a team of
experienced accountants into every Islamic bank operating in the UK as a
bank under the 1979 Act, to try to put a proper and cautious value on its
assets.
Another financial analyst states:36
Even if a method could be found for assessing the risks to
calculate the capital necessary, little comfort could be taken from the
profitability which is usually relied upon to cover day-to-day losses
arising from the bank's business, because a substantial part of an Islamic
bank's portfolio is venture capital without any guaranteed return.
It is evident then that even if there is a desire to
accommodate the Islamic system, the new procedures that need be developed and
the modifications that need be made to existing procedures are so large that
the chances of such accommodation in a cautious sector such as banking is very
remote indeed. Any relaxation of strict supervision is precluded because
should an Islamic bank fail it would undermine the confidence in the whole
financial system, with which it is inevitably identified. As Suratgar puts it:37
There could be potential dangers for the international
system, where the failure of such an institution could bring with it the
failure of other associated institutions, or of all the Western banking
institutions which come closely tied to with such an operation.
The question has engaged the attention of Central Banks in
Muslim countries as well. But reliable satisfactory methods are still to
developed.
4.4.3 Tax regulations
Another important consideration is the tax procedures in
non-Muslim countries. While interest is a ‘passive' income, profit is an
earned income which is treated differently. In addition, in trade financing
there are title transfers twice -- once from seller to bank and then from bank
to buyer -- and therefore twice taxed on this account decreasing the
profitability of the venture. The Director of the International Islamic Bank
of Denmark says:38
Tax laws are against the Islamic philosophy and pose the
greatest difficulty. In most OECD countries Mudarabha is constrained by
fiscal acts which define profits as an after tax item for the profit creator
and a fully taxable item for the profit receiver.
4.5 Discussion
and suggestions
People have needs -- food, clothes, houses, machinery,
services; the list is endless. Entrepreneurs perceive these needs and develop
ways and means of catering to them. They advertise their products and
services, peoples expectations are raised and people become customers of the
entrepreneur. If the customers' needs are fulfilled according to their
expectations they continue to patronise the entrepreneur and his enterprise
flourishes. Otherwise his enterprise fails and people take to other
entrepreneurs.
Banks too are enterprises; they cater to peoples' needs
connected with money -- safe-keeping, acquiring capital, transferring funds
etc. The fact that they existed for centuries and continue to exist and
prosper is proof that their methods are good and they fulfil the customers'
needs and expectations. Conventional commercial banking system as it operates
today is accepted in all countries except the Islamic world where it is
received with some reservation. The reservation is on account of the fact that
the banking operations involve dealing in interest which is prohibited in
Islam. Conventional banks have ignored this concern on the part of their
Muslim clientele. Muslims patronised the conventional banks out of necessity
and, when another entrepreneur -- the Islamic banker -- offered to address
their concern many Muslims turned to him. The question is: has the new
entrepreneur successfully met their concerns, needs and expectations? If not
he may have to put up his shutters!
Broadly speaking, banks have three types of different
customers: depositors, borrowers and seekers of bank's other services such
as money transfer. Since services do not generally involve dealing in interest
Muslims have no problem transacting such businesses with conventional banks;
neither do Islamic banks experience any problems in providing these services.
Among the depositors there are current account holders who too, similarly,
have no problems. It is the savings account holders and the borrowers who have
reservations in dealing with the conventional banks. In the following
paragraphs we will see how well the Islamic banks have succeeded in addressing
their customers' special concern.
4.5.1
Savings accounts and capital guarantee
As pointed out earlier, our concern here is the savings
account holders. As the name itself indicates the primary aim of the saving
account depositor is the safe-keeping of his savings. It is correctly
perceived by the conventional banker and he guarantees the return of the
deposit intoto. The banker also assumes that the depositor will prefer
to keep his money with him in preference to another who might also provide the
same guarantee if the depositor is provided an incentive. This incentive is
called interest, and this interest is made proportional to the amount and
length of time it is left with the bank in order to encourage more money
brought into the bank and left there for longer periods of time. In addition,
the interest rate is fixed in advance so that the depositor and the banker are
fully aware of their respective rights and obligations from the beginning. And
laws have been enacted to guarantee their enforcement. In Economic theory the
interest is often taken to be the “compensation” the depositors demand and
receive for parting with their savings. The fact that the depositors accept
the paid interest and that, given other things being equal, they prefer the
bank or the scheme which offers the highest interest proves the banker's
assumption correct.
The scheme is simple, transparent and seems to have
satisfied the requirements of all types of savers -- from teenagers to old-age
pensioners, from individuals to large institutions, pension funds and
endowments, from small amounts to millions, and from a few weeks or months to
years -- that it has survived over centuries and operates across national,
cultural and religious borders.
The situation is very different in the Islamic banks. Here
too the depositor's first aim is to keep his savings in safe custody.
Islamic bankers divide the conventional savings account into two categories
(alternatively, create a new kind of account): savings account and investment
account. The investment accounts operate fully under the PLS scheme -- capital
is not guaranteed, neither is there any pre-fixed return. Under the savings
account the nominal value of the deposit is guaranteed, but they receive no
further guaranteed returns.39 Banks may consider funds under the
savings accounts too as part of their resources and use it to create assets.
This is theory. In practice, however, the banks prefer, encourage and
emphasise the investment accounts. This is because since their assets operate
under the PLS scheme they might incur losses on these assets which losses they
cannot pass onto the savings accounts depositors on account of the capital
guarantee on these accounts. In the process the first aim of the depositor is
pushed aside and the basic rule of commercial banking --capital guarantee-- is
broken.40
It is suggested that all Islamic banks guarantee the capital
under their savings accounts. This will satisfy the primary need and
expectation of an important section of the depositors and, in Muslim countries
where both Islamic and conventional banks co-exist, will induce more
depositors to bank with the Islamic banks. At the same time, it will remove
the major objection to establishing Islamic banks in non-Muslim countries.
But the question is how does the bank make an income from
these deposits? We will examine this in the next section.
4.5.2 Loans
with a service charge
We have already seen that all the problems of the Islamic
banks arise from their need to acquire their assets under the PLS scheme. A
simple solution does, in fact, already exist in the current theories of
Islamic banking. It need only be pointed out and acted upon. We will examine
the provisions in the Iranian, Pakistani and the Siddiqi models.41
All three models provide for loans with a service charge.
Though the specific rules are not identical, the principle is the same. We
suggest that the funds in the deposit accounts (current and savings) be used
to grant loans (short- and long-term) with a service charge. By doing this the
Islamic banks will be able to provide all the loan facilities that
conventional banks provide while giving capital guarantee for depositors and
earning an income for themselves. Furthermore, and it is important, they can
avoid all the problems discussed in section 4.3. This would also remove the
rest of the obstacles in opening and operating Islamic banks in non-Muslim
countries.
The bonus for the borrowers is that the service charge
levied by the Islamic banks will necessarily be less than the interest charged
by conventional banks.
Let us now look at the existing relevant rules in the three
models. The Iranian model provides for Gharz-al hasaneh whose
definition, purpose and operation are given in Articles 15, 16 and 17 of
Regulations relating to the granting of banking facilities:42
Article 15
Gharz-al-hasaneh is a contract in which one (the lender)
of the two parties relinquishes a specific portion of his possessions to the
other party (the borrower) which the borrower is obliged to return to the
lender in kind or, where not possible, its cash value.
Article 16
... the banks ... shall set aside a part of their
resources and provide Gharz-al-hasaneh for the following purposes:
(a) to provide equipment, tools and other necessary
resources so as to enable the creation of employment, in the form of
co-operative bodies, for those who lack the necessary means;
(b) to enable expansion in production, with particular
emphasis on agricultural, livestock and industrial products;
(c) to meet essential needs.
Article 17
The expenses incurred in the provision of Gharz-al-hasaneh
shall be, in each case, calculated on the basis of the directives issued by
Bank Markazi Jomhouri Islami Iran43 and collected from the
borrower.
In Pakistan, permissible modes of financing include:44
(i) Loans not carrying any interest on which the banks may
recover a service charge not exceeding the proportionate cost of the
operation, excluding the cost of funds and provisions for bad and doubtful
debts. The maximum service charge permissible to each bank will be
determined by the State Bank from time to time.
(ii) Qard-e-hasana loans given on compassionate grounds
free of any interest or service charge and repayable if and when the
borrower is able to pay.
Siddiqi has suggested that 50 percent of the funds in the
‘loan' (i.e. current and savings) accounts be used to grant short-term
loans.45 A fee is to be charged for providing these loans:46
An appropriate way of levying such a fee would be to
require prospective borrowers to pay a fixed amount on each application,
regardless of the amount required, the term of the loan or whether the
application is granted or rejected. Then the applicants to whom a loan is
granted may be required to pay an additional prescribed fee for all the
entries made in the banks registers. The criterion for fixing the fees must
be the actual expenditure which the banks have incurred in scrutinising the
applications and making decisions, and in maintaining accounts until loans
are repaid. These fees should not be made a source of income for the banks,
but regarded solely as a means of maintaining and managing the interest-free
loans.
It is clear from the above that all three models agree on
the need for having cash loans as one mode of financing, and that this service
should be paid for by the borrower. Though the details may vary, all seem to
suggest that the charge should be the absolute cost only. We suggest that a
percentage of this absolute cost be added to the charge as a payment to the
bank for providing this service. This should enable an Islamic bank to exist
and function independently of its performance in its PLS operations.
4.5.3
Investment under PLS scheme
The idea of participatory financing introduced by the
Islamic banking movement is a unique and positive contribution to modern
banking. However, as we saw earlier, by making the PLS mode of financing the
main (often almost the only) mode of financing the Islamic banks have run into
several difficulties. If, as suggested in the previous section, the Islamic
banks would provide all the conventional financing through lending from their
deposit accounts (current and savings), it will leave their hands free to
engage in this responsible form of financing innovatively, using the funds in
their investment accounts. They could then engage in genuine Mudaraba financing.
Being partners in an enterprise they will have access to its accounts, and the
problems associated with the non-availability of accounts will not arise.
Commenting on Mudaraba financing, The Economist
says:47
.... some people in the West have begun to find the idea
attractive. It gives the provider of money a strong incentive to be sure he
is doing something sensible with it. What a pity the West's banks did not
have that incentive in so many of their lending decisions in the 1970s and
1980s. It also emphasises the sharing of responsibility, by all the users of
money. That helps to make the free-market system more open; you might say
more democratic.
4.6 Conclusions
Islamic banking is a very young concept. Yet it has already
been implemented as the only system in two Muslim countries; there are Islamic
banks in many Muslim countries, and a few in non-Muslim countries as well.
Despite the successful acceptance there are problems. These problems are
mainly in the area of financing.
With only minor changes in their practices, Islamic banks
can get rid of all their cumbersome, burdensome and sometimes doubtful forms
of financing and offer a clean and efficient interest-free banking. All the
necessary ingredients are already there. The modified system will make use of
only two forms of financing -- loans with a service charge and Mudaraba participatory
financing -- both of which are fully accepted by all Muslim writers on the
subject.
Such a system will offer an effective banking system where
Islamic banking is obligatory and a powerful alternative to conventional
banking where both co-exist. Additionally, such a system will have no problem
in obtaining authorisation to operate in non-Muslim countries.
Participatory financing is a unique feature of Islamic
banking, and can offer responsible financing to socially and economically
relevant development projects. This is an additional service Islamic banks
offer over and above the traditional services provided by conventional
commercial banks.
Notes:
1 Rad (1991), pp.3-4.
2 Siddiqi (1980), pp.219-20.
3 ibid. p.222.
4 Arabia, April 1982, No.8; p.46
5 Wilson (1984)
6 Arabia, April 1982, No.8; p.46
7 Wilson (1984)
8 ibid.
9 All quoted in Rad (1991). p.13-14.
10 Ausaf Ahmed (1994). p.373.
11 Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987).
12 Elimination of Riba from the Economy.
Islamabad: IPS, 1994.
13 At present the author has no information as
to the recent situation in Iran.
14 ibid. p.24.
15 Quoted in: Rad (1991). p.56.
16 Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987). p.24.
17 ibid. p.24.
18 ibid. p.25.
19 Musharakah and Musharaka are different
English spellings of the same Arabic word.
20 ibid. p.25.
21 Zaman (1994). p.204.
22 Mudarba, Mudarabha and Mudaraba
are different English spellings of the same Arabic word.
23 ibid. p.25.
24 Italics are mine
25 The Economist (1994). p.9.
26 Qadir (1994). p.105.
27 Ahmad (1994). p.46-47.
28 Zaman (1994). p.208.
29 ibid. p.203.
30 PTC (participation term certificate) and TFC
(term finance certificate) are the two Pakistani instruments to provide long-,
medium- and short-term finace.
31 ibid. p.212.
32 All quotations in this section appear in Rad
(1991).
33 Pemberton (1984)
34 Schotta (1985)
35 Steele (1984)
36 Suratgar (1984)
37 ibid. p.30.
38 Karsten (1982) p.120.
39 It should be noted that early writers such as
Mawdudi (1961) and Siddiqi (1968) conceived of savings accounts with capital
guarantee. In the Iranian model too capital is guaranteed. The Law for Usury-
(Interest) free Banking (August 1983), Chapter II, article 4. In Pakistan,
however, “... all deposits accepted by a banking company shall be on the
basis of participation in profit and loss of the banking company, except
deposits received in Current Account ...” State Bank of Pakistan, BCD
Circular No 13, 20 June 1984. See Appendix in Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987),
pp.36-37.
40 We are at present not aware of any survey or
case studies of depositors which would enable us to assess their reaction to
this state of affairs.
41 Laws and regulations relating to
interest-free banking in Iran and Pakistan are reproduced in Iqbal and
Mirakhor (1987), pp.31-58. Siddiqi (1988).
42 Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987), pp.36-37.
43 Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
44 Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987), p.45.
45 the other 10 and 40 percent respectively are
to be used for cash reserve and mudaraba investment.
46 Siddiqi (1988), p.69.
47 op cit. p.9-10.