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THE UNCHANGING IN A CHANGING WORLD
The Shari'ah is for all times to come, equally valid under all
circumstances. The Muslim insistence on the immutability of the Shari'ah is highly
puzzling to many people, but any other view would be inconsistent with its basic concept.
If it is divinely ordained, it can be changed by a human being only if authorised by God
or His Prophet. Those who advise bringing it into line with current thinking recognise
this difficulty. Hence they recommend to Muslims that the 'legal' provisions in the Qur'an
and the concept of the Prophet as law-giver and ruler should be 'downgraded' .
But, as the manifestation of God's infinite mercy, knowledge and
wisdom, the Shari'ah cannot be amended to conform to changing human values and standards:
rather, it is the absolute norm to which all human values and conduct must conform; it is
the frame to which they must be referred; it is the scale on which they must be weighed.
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As we have already seen, the claim that the Shari'ah is eternal and
all-embracing does not in any way imply that every issue for all times to come has been
decided. The mechanism through which the Shari'ah solves a problem posed by an
unspecified, new or changing situation can be best understood in the framework of the
categorisation of its norms and rules and the role it gives to human reason in the form of
Ijtihad.
The code of behaviour and conduct laid down by the Shari'ah divides
human acts of heart and body into the following five categories:
1 expressly prohibited (haram); 2 expressly enjoined (wajib or fard); 3
disliked but not prohibited (makruh), hence permissible under certain circumstances; 4
recommended but not enjoined (mandub), hence no obligation to comply; 5 simply without any
injunction or opinion, and hence permitted through silence (mubah).
It is not commonly realised what a great blessing has been imparted to
the Shari'ah by this categorisation: it enables the Shari'ah to accord a vast expanse and
degree of latitude to individual choice, freedom and initiative under varying human
circumstances. Things which are prohibited or enjoined are few and a major part of man's
day-to-day life falls in the mubah category. Still more important and revolutionary is the
principle that, in matters of worship, in a narrow sense, only what has been expressly
enjoined or recommended, and nothing else, is obligatory or desirable; while, in matters
of day-to-day life, whatever is not prohibited is permissible. This closes the door for
any religious vested interests to impose upon God's servants additional burdens and duties
in the name of God as has so often been done in history; but at the same time it keeps
wide open the options for resolving new problems.
For example, even to make a sixth prayer obligatory every day is not
permissible. Nor can extra moneys be extracted or levied in the name of God or spent for
personal ends, as both the amount and heads of expenditure have been specified. But in the
matter of food, everything may be eaten, with the exception of a few things which have
been prohibited. Indeed no human being has the authority to prohibit what God and His
Prophet have not forbidden; to forbid anything permitted by God (halal) is as much of a
sin as to do what is prohibited (haram). A Muslim has the right, whenever it is claimed
that something is obligatory or prohibited, to demand the basis for this assertion in the
Qur'an or the Sunnah. On another level, while the Qur'an simply lays down the principle
that 'all affairs of Muslims must be settled by consultation', how that consultation and
the ensuing consensus is to be achieved has been left to be decided by Muslims in each age
according to their own circumstances.
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Total submission to God does not imply any lesser role for human
reason. On the contrary, human reason has a very important and fundamental role to play in
the Shari'ah (except that it will be unreasonable for it to overrule its own God). No
doubt the Shari'ah is not rational in the sense that its authority does not rest in human
reason; but it is rational in the sense that it cannot be meaningfully opposed to reason.
This role consists of:
- understanding and interpreting the divine guidance in new or changed
situations; - applying the divine guidance to actual situations in human life; - framing
rules, regulations and byelaws for the implementation of the basic principles and
injunctions; - legislating in those vast areas where nothing has been had down in the
original sources.
The conduct of the Companions of the Prophet and those who came after
them, and the differences in opinions which. emerged in the time of the Prophet himself,
in the period immediately after him and among successive generations of Muslims, in all
spheres of the Shari'ah, bear ample testimony t the role of human reason in the
Shari'ah.
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The role of human reason in the Shari'ah, exercised through
understanding and interpretation, ijtihad and consensus, provides it with a built-in
mechanism to meet the demands of any changed human situation. The complexities of life and
the novelty of the situations which the Muslims faced within fifty years of the Prophet's
death bore no comparison to the simple life in Madina Yet the Shari'ah successfully coped
with all the situations, not only in that period, but for more than a thousand years
afterwards -indeed, till the Muslims fell under the political subjugation of the Western
powers. This in itself is living testimony to its inne- vitality and inherent capability
to face any challenge.
What is important to understand is that none of what is stable and
permanent in the Shari'ah is of a nature as to need change' Where changes are necessary
due to newly-emerging situations the Shari'ah has laid down broad principles only and left
its adherent to work out the details. Where it has chosen to be specific there is in
reality no need for change.
Again, it is only the changed human situations which the Shari'ah
caters for, and not for changes in primary and essential values and standards: the
divinely-given values and standard are final.
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The issues involved in re-establishing the Shariah in ,moder- times can
be better understood against the background of the history of its development.
The Shari'ah, as the code of life derived from the Qur'an and the Sunnah, in its present form, has developed over a long period of time. During the
Prophet's life, he was available as the supreme source of guidance and all situations and
issues could be referred to him. He either received a direct revelation or laid down the
code by his own prophetic knowledge, wisdom and authority. And, if a situation arose when
he could not be approached, the Companions exercised their own judgements to find a
solution in the light of the Qur'an and whatever they had learnt from the Prophet. That he
approved of this procedure is borne out by many instances.
For about 100 years after his death, as the Muslim society expanded and
new situations arose, the Companions of the Prophet and the scholars trained by them used
the same procedure of understanding, interpreting and applying the Qur'an and the
Sunnah,
using their own reason and judgement. On the one hand, the Khilafate Rashida
(Rightly-Guided Caliphate) provided a central legislative and political machinery for this
purpose. And, on the other, Muslims approached any Companion or trusted scholar of the
Qur'an and the Sunnah who was near at hand to find out answers to the problems faced by
them. They did not consider themselves bound to follow any one particular person and every
Companion and scholar answered their questions to the best of his knowledge and wisdom
without recourse to any organised body of jurisprudence.
After the period of the Khilafate Rashida, Islamic political authority
separated from the legal authority and could not play such an effective role; during the
next 150 years, however, many Muslim scholars arose to answer the growing needs of
Muslims. They gave definite shape to the principles and concepts which were already being
used in determining the Shari'ah, and also dealt with the ever more complex situations
being faced by the Muslim society. It was during this period that great jurists like
Ja'fer Sadiq (d. 148/765), Abu Hanifa (d. 150/767), Malik (d. 179/795), Shafi'i
(d.204/819), and Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (d.273/886) appeared. Each developed a circle of
followers; although there were still no organised schools of law and
jurisprudence-ordinary Muslims referring their problems to any scholar they could find.
This is how a particular scholar came to be followed more in a particular region. By 350
AH the principles laid down by these great scholars had developed into well-defined
schools of thought and had begun to command the exclusive allegiance of scholars. Over the
next 300 years ordinary Muslims also came to adhere to a particular school and owe
exclusive allegiance to it. This happened, as explained, because they followed the school
of law to which the scholar or religious leader they found near and trusted belonged, or
in some cases, to which the rulers and judges belonged. Inter-school debates and arguments
also developed leading to, as often happens in such situations, a hardening of positions.
The fall of Baghdad, in the middle of the 7th century AH, was a
watershed. The instinct for preservation became the foremost consideration in an age of
intellectual disintegration and political instability. Although there was merit in this
caution - the consensus that had been achieved after such tremendous effort by giants
could not be allowed to be undone by pygmies - the unwillingness to think dynamically
contributed to the decay and intellectual ossification of the Ummah.
The situation became worse after Muslims fell under the political
subjugation of the European powers; they, however, continued to live by the Shari'ah as
best they could. But they were no longer masters of their own affairs as an alien culture
did its best to sever their links with their culture and traditions.
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Much ado has been made about the closure of the gate of ijtihad, the
subsequent rigidity that set in and the need for making it wide open today. We have
already noted briefly how this happened. ijtihad worked as a dynamic institution in the
first five centuries of Islam. The giant intellectual upsurge generated by the study of
the Shari'ah has few parallels. Later, due to circumstances like the Mongol invasion and
Western domination, the Muslims had to fall back upon formal law to preserve the identity
of the Ummah. But even when the door was presumably closed, whenever new situations arose,
efforts were made to find solutions. Of course, those solutions did not involve
repudiation of the Qur'an, the Sunnah and Ijma-which is perhaps what irks so many.
Ijtihad can be done only by those who have the ability and competence,
knowledge and understanding, and, above all, the character and piety to undertake the
crucial and sacred task of determining the Shari'ah. Whatever may be said about the
strictness and rigidity or otherwise of the qualifications imposed by the orthodox, the
only criterion that will prevail in the final analysis is that any new Ijtihad must find
acceptance by the Muslim masses, for Islam has not left its revelations in the care of a
'Church' .
One thing is certain: Muslims will never accept the Ijtihad of a Harun al-Rashid or a Kemal Ataturk or a Nasser or a Sukarno. An Abu
Hanifa, who died in prison
and was lashed for his views, or an Ahmad ibn Hanbal, who was persecuted and whipped for
his opinions, are more likely to find acceptance by the sheer depth of their faith,
steadfastness, fidelity, piety and knowledge. The ethics of the modernists are all too
often based on expediency rather than on exemplary practice of faith; no wonder they can
make no headway.
What is required today is a generation of Muslim scholars who know the
Qur'an and the Sunnah, who fully understand the value of their heritage of fourteen
hundred years, who are highly knowledgeable about Western thought and the strengths and
weaknesses of modern times, who have the intellectual vigour and originality of thought to
tackle problems afresh, and who, above all, possess the moral and spiritual qualities
which bear testimony to their submission and fidelity to God and His Prophet. And such
scholars must be supported by political rulers who will look to Ijtihad not as an escape
route but as the true way to live by the Shari'ah .
Unfortunately, since they regained their political independence after
the Second World War, many Muslim societies have been in a state of flux. The people who
have inherited the political authority from the foreign rulers, by their training and
education, are incapable of leading the Muslim masses on the road of the
Shari'ah.
Conversely, the masses themselves remain committed to following this path, even though
they are spiritually and morally weak. The result has been serious inner conflict and
tension .
The non-Muslim minorities within Muslim countries and the Western
countries, as well as international observers, will do well not to hinder the sometimes
painful process of regaining self- identity, but rather seek to understand it, if they
can.
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Will not various schools of law and sects present formidable problems
in the implementation of the Shari'ah? Yes, to some extent. As we know, countless scholars
and hundreds of schools of thought blossomed during the first four centuries of Islam, its
intellectual Golden Age, but only four have survived among Sunnis and most Shi'as follow
Ja'fer Sadiq. The Hanafi school is predominant in Bangladesh, Pakistan, India,
Afghanistan, West Asia and lower Egypt; the Maliki in North and West Africa; the Shafi'i
in Indonesia and Malaysia; the Hanbali in Arabia; and the Ja'feri in Iran and parts of
Iraq.
Although there have been periods of dogmatism, sectarian violence and
rigid attitudes (none, however, comparable in intensity to the religious wars of Europe),
the differences between the various schools pale into insignificance when compared with
their similarities. Indeed, in essentials they hardly have any differences. Divergencies
occur in the way that two courts, attempting to interpret the same law, may arrive at
different conclusions. The differences may present problems, but they are not
insurmountable. Although it may be difficult to return to the traditions of the earliest
times of Islam, a solution is possible by allowing Muslims in each region to implement the
Shari'ah through a consensus of persons commanding the trust of the majority; while in
personal law each sect should be free to follow its own legal system.
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Large Muslim communities now live in non-Muslim countries. Many have
even made the West their home. How can they live by the Shari'ah? Obviously they have
every intention of continuing to live where they are now and of making their own
distinctive contribution to the societies around them. This contribution will be based on
the rich culture of Islam, at the heart of which is the Shari'ah. That a vast majority of
them, under very difficult circumstances, still try to observe the Shari'ah as best they
can is a further testimony to its powerful roots. Unfortunately, Muslims living in
non-Muslim countries, especially in the West, face very many difficulties and extreme
hardships in their attempts to observe the Shari'ah. The difficulties extend to very small
and simple day-to-day matters such as their worship rites and what they may eat, drink and
wear. Few real opportunities are available, for example, to offer Friday prayers or to
have appropriate diets in such institutions as schools, hospitals and prisons. Indeed, in
many cases the majority communities and their governments simply fail to acknowledge the
existence of Muslims in their midst.
Efforts to assimilate Muslims into the majority culture at the expense
of their observance of Islam will be of no benefit to the culture itself. Muslims who
contravene the Shari'ah live with a permanent sense of inner guilt deriving from the
awareness that they have betrayed their own consciences. Such people are of little worth
to any society.
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